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INTRODUCTION
In their article The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate1 and its companion pieces,2 Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and
Robert Scott [hereinafter “CG&S”] introduce and explore the concept
of “contractual black holes,” boilerplate contract provisions that have
been “emptied of any recordable meaning”3 through rote repetition,4
the introduction of essentially “random variations in language,”5 and
the absence of “any validation [of their meaning] from courts or
industry institutions.”6 The article presents a detailed case study of the
sovereign debt market’s slow response to the Second Circuit’s errant
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Ramseyer, Steve Ware, and participants at the Duke Conference on Contractual Black Holes
(2017) for helpful conversations. Special thanks are due to the hole theorists themselves for
engaging conversations about their piece over the past year.
1. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).
2. The other two papers in the Black Hole corpus are Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, &
Robert E. Scott, Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (Eric Brosseau, Jean-Michel Galmant & Jerome Sgaard eds., forthcoming 2017)
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=6304&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/VC3Y-QLKN] and Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation
in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming
2017) [hereinafter, Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate].
3. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 2.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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interpretation of the pari passu clause at issue in NML v. Argentina,7 a
common clause in sovereign debt contracts that they view as the
“prototypical exemplar”8 of a black hole. Noting that the NML
decision put a multi-trillion dollar market at risk by making it more
difficult to restructure sovereign debt,9 and that it took years for
market transactors to draft clauses eliminating the problem,10 the
authors conclude that changes in contract doctrine are needed to deal
with the problems caused by black holes. As they explain, “while black
holes often remain for many years as relatively harmless surplusage,
they can [also] generate substantial social costs once litigation results
in an interpretation that introduces inefficiencies into the market.”11
This Comment focuses on the authors’ proposed doctrinal
solution to the black hole problem, which seeks to eliminate any
inquiry into “subjective intent” when courts are faced with the task of
interpreting a black hole. It explores the conceptual and practical
challenges of implementing the authors’ proposal and then questions
whether legal reform is really needed to deal with the black hole
problem. Part I identifies several common ways that standardized
contract provisions that are often indistinguishable from true black
holes may arise.12 It suggests that any doctrinal solution to the black
hole problem will have to either reliably distinguish real black holes
from these relatively common “black hole apparitions,” or be desirable
when applied to both types of provisions. Part II describes the
proposed reform and explores the practical barriers to implementing
7. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). The black
hole corpus also focuses on an earlier interpretation of the pari passu clause rendered by a
Brussels court in 2000. See Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
8. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 7.
9. Interestingly, the Second Circuit seemed to reject the idea that it was jeopardizing the
market as a whole by making restructuring more difficult. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263
(explaining why this effect is unlikely to occur.)
10. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 70 (concluding that “the inherently greater inertia costs [and
social costs] that result from an aberrant interpretation of a black hole term,” as compared to an
ordinary unclear term, and the “greater difficulty market players face in overcoming the resulting
collective action problem[s]” slow the adoption of new and better contractual terms).
11. Id.
12. Although it is possible that some of the types of clauses this Comment views as “black
hole apparitions” would be classified as genuine black holes by CG&S, their search for additional
examples of black holes by holding a conference on the subject at Duke Law School suggests that
these ubiquitous types of clauses with uncertain meaning are unlikely to come within the purview
of their definition. As Gulati explained, “black holes where meaning has been lost are different
from provisions where there is a general sense of what they mean, but there is some vagueness or
lack of clarity.” E-mail from Mitu Gulati, Professor of Law, Duke University, to author (Sept. 23,
2017) (on file with author).
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it. Along the way it also sketches out several alternative avenues for
solving the problems evidenced in the pari passu saga. It suggests that
these avenues, while more limited in scope than the authors’ proposed
reform, may turn out to be more feasible and less costly to implement.
Part III questions whether any doctrinal or other solution to the socalled black hole problem can be justified on the basis of the lessons
learned from the pari passu saga alone, given that other markets have
been able to overcome collective action problems and adopt and
amend standard-form contracts through processes that have tended to
work more quickly and less contentiously over time. Finally, Part IV
concludes by suggesting that the interpretive approach adopted by the
Second Circuit in NML might be a passably good response to the black
hole problem writ large.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS
CG&S suggest that contract doctrine should treat the
interpretation of black holes differently from the interpretation of
other unclear or essentially meaningless contractual provisions. Yet
both conceptually and practically, it may be extraordinarily difficult to
distinguish true black holes from what might be called “black hole
apparitions.” Black hole apparitions are contract provisions that are
indistinguishable on their face from black holes yet will not necessarily
give rise to the drafting inertia and social costs that led CG&S to
conclude that a doctrinal response to the black hole phenomenon was
needed. Recognizing the existence of these apparitions suggests that
any doctrinal reform that turns on a provision’s status as a black hole
will,13 in practice, bring many black hole apparitions into its orbit. As a
consequence, any such change is likely to add significant costs to
ordinary commercial litigation and create and/or exacerbate
opportunities for strategic behavior. Against this background, and to
understand how common these apparitions are likely to be, it is useful
to look more closely at three common types of black hole apparitions,
those whose origins are procedural, relational or rational.

13. In order for a doctrine that conditions on whether a clause is or is not a black hole to be
workable, a clause’s status must be verifiable by a court—that is, a court must be able to determine
with reasonable accuracy at a cost the transactors consider reasonable from an ex ante perspective
whether or not something is a black hole. See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and
the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271
(1992).
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A. Procedural Apparitions
One category of black hole apparitions is what might be termed
procedural apparitions—contract provisions that are at a high risk of
losing their meaning due to state-supplied procedural rules or
transactors’ procedure-related drafting choices.
For example, black holes are especially likely to arise in markets
where most contracts provide for arbitration under the American
Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules.14
Although it is increasingly common for AAA arbitrators to produce
reasoned opinions rather than mere awards,15 these opinions are
typically kept private and are of no precedential value.16 As a
consequence, the terms of these contracts (whether standard or
bespoke) are correspondingly less likely to be interpreted in written
opinions with precedential value and are at a heightened risk of
gradually losing their meaning over time. The routine inclusion of a
AAA arbitration clause, therefore, increases the risk that some of an
agreement’s provisions will devolve into black hole apparitions.17

14. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (Am. Arbitration
Ass’n 2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf. [https://perma.cc/
E8EW-CBBP].
15. The AAA discourages written opinions but permits parties to request them. See
CHARLES A. COOPER, HARRY KAMINSKY & NEIL CARMICHAEL, MANUAL FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 162 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 1999) (“Currently in domestic arbitrations, the AAA
does not encourage commercial arbitrators to write opinions which give their reasons for the
award. However, in instances where both parties request an opinion prior to the appointment of
the arbitrator, the arbitrator should comply.”). While transactors might opt to revise a clause in
face of a seemingly aberrant arbitration ruling, they might also surmise, much as the sovereign
debt community did after the ruling of the Brussels court, that a more sensible panel (or as in the
case of the pari passu clause the Second Circuit Court of Appeals) would rule differently. See
Choi et al., supra note 1, at 12.
16. But see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010) (suggesting that in some contexts arbitration decisions that
are not technically precedent nevertheless have an effect on the outcome of future disputes). In
addition, there are indications that companies fear that arbitral decisions will be given some
weight if they have future disputes with the same counter-party. For example, Verizon’s consumer
agreement provides for AAA commercial arbitration, includes a class action waiver, and also
contains a clause stating that “[a]n arbitration award and any judgment confirming it apply only
to that specific case; it can’t be used in any other case except to enforce the award itself.” Customer
Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.verizonwireless.com/legal/notices/
customer-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/3A2L-6YGT]; see also What’s Going on? Arbitration
Explanation, WASTE MGMT., http://mediaroom.wm.com/legal-notice/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-X4
GB] (“The award of the arbitrator may be entered and enforced in any court having jurisdiction.
An arbitration award and any judgment confirming it apply only to that specific case; it cannot be
used in any other case except to enforce the arbitration award itself.”).
17. For example, trade association-run private legal systems are designed in ways that will
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Similarly, the standards of appellate review and the fact that most
state and many federal trial courts do not routinely publish opinions18
might also play a role in the emergence of some types of contractual
black holes. The vast majority of appellate courts provide greater
deference to lower-court decisions on question of fact than on
questions of law, or in some jurisdictions, mixed questions of law and
fact. As a consequence, the meaning of standard-like provisions that
are interpreted using a highly fact-specific inquiry is less likely to be
appealed than the meaning of rule-like provisions whose interpretation
is more often considered a matter of law. Standard-like provisions are
correspondingly less likely to be interpreted in a written opinion of any
kind. They are therefore more likely than rule-like provisions to
devolve into meaningless provisions that look like classic black holes.19
B. Relational Apparitions
A second type of black hole apparition, which might be called a
relational apparition, is particularly likely to emerge: (1) where there is
a written or standard-form template that is used in most deals in a
particular market; or (2) where seemingly bespoke contracts are used,20
but those who negotiate them (either the business people or the
contract lawyers) share a rough but deeply ingrained understanding

strongly discourage the emergence of black holes. At the National Grain and Feed Association,
for example, arbitrators write reasoned opinions that are posted on the association’s website.
When a rule is unclear, or appears to lead to an undesirable or unanticipated result, the arbitrators
will state this explicitly, apply the rule as it is stated, and note that the association’s rules
committee should consider revising the rule, something that is typically done. See Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1780 & nn.50–51 (1996).
18. STEVEN M. BARKEN, BARBARA A. BINTLIFF & MARY WHISNER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 41 (10th ed. 2015) (“Ordinarily, cases decided by state trial courts are not
reported. . . . Only a few states, such as New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, publish
some trial court opinions, but those selected are few in number and represent only a very small
portion of the total cases heard by trial courts.”). A similar problem may exist with respect to
cases decided in federal court. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker,
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 727 (2007) (“[S]tarkly
expos[ing] how little trial court work is explained through written opinions.”).
19. It is, however, possible that the doctrinal contours of the black hole or no black hole
determination would become clearer over time because under the proposed change this would be
determined as a “matter of law.” See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 68.
20. CG&S focus mostly on standard commercial provisions in standardized contracts.
However, both black holes and black hole apparitions can arise in seemingly bespoke contracts
as well. To the extent this phenomenon exists, the proposed reform, in as much as it seems to
apply only to standard contracts with boilerplate provision, would be underinclusive with respect
to the types of holes found in these seemingly bespoke agreements.
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about the types and content of terms that are commonly included in
such agreements. In both of these situations, transactors may be
especially hesitant to propose changes to commonly used terms. When
a transactor proposes a change in the usual way of doing things, even
when that usual way is not terribly important or when the variant
creates value for both transactors, her counter-party might well
interpret it as a signal that she is either more likely to engage in
strategic behavior or more focused on her legal rights than the average
transactor. The counter-party might therefore ask for protective
changes in response. This, in turn, might trigger a cascade of change
requests that could greatly increase contracting costs, reduce the
likelihood of post-signing cooperation,21 or destroy the deal
completely.22 As long as transactors are aware of or intuit this dynamic,
they might be reluctant to propose changing or eliminating common
provisions, even if these provisions appear to be meaningless or
irrelevant and standardization, across either the market as a whole or
particular subsets of market participants, has no independent value.
Relational black hole apparitions may also be common in markets
where transactors trust one another or where the force of reputationbased network governance is strong. In some markets where genuine
interpersonal trust is present, it remains common for transactors to put
the contract in the drawer. As a consequence, transactors will likely
spend little or no time negotiating its terms. In these situations,
contract language is quite likely to be unthinkingly recycled.23
Similarly, in markets where transactors rely on reputation-based
network governance to support exchange, using similar contracts
across the market makes these reputation-based forces stronger.24
21. The way that a contract is negotiated has an effect on how well the business deal can be
operationalized once the contract is signed. See Danny Ertel, Getting Past Yes: Negotiating as if
Implementation Mattered, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 60, 62 (2004).
22. For a more complete discussion of this bargaining dynamic and the way that it effects the
terms of agreements, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms & Default Rules Analysis, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993).
23. Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts To Build
Informal Relations to Support Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 982, 987 (noting that Stewart
Macaulay’s finding that in commercial contracting relationships problems tended to be worked
out informally and “written contracts . . . were often highly-standardized documents that were
often confined to the drawer,” held in a modern day sample of non-innovative firms where
informal methods of dispute resolution remained common and firms either “did not generate
[formal contracts] or relied only on standardized documents,” but did not hold in a sample of
innovative firms).
24. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015) (explaining how widely
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When contracts are relatively standardized and/or there is widespread
consensus about what constitutes cooperation and good-faith
behavior,25 the network need only transmit information about how a
transactor behaved in order for other market participants to assess the
desirability of dealing with him. In contrast, when contracts are more
varied, information about both the scope of the relevant obligations
and actual behavior may need to be transmitted through the relevant
network in order for reputation to play an important role in governing
exchange—a process that is bound to be more expensive, less effective,
and more error prone than in markets where relatively standard
agreements are used.26 Since lawsuits are less common in markets
where genuine trust is present or network governance is operational,
fewer terms in commercial contracts are likely to be interpreted by
courts and both black holes and black hole apparitions are
correspondingly more likely to arise.
C. Rational Apparitions
A third and final type of black hole apparition, and one that may
also emerge in both standard-form and bespoke contracts, is a rational
black hole. A rational black hole is a term that is left deliberately vague
or without meaning at the time of contracting.27 The economic
known and standardized contract provisions may affect the strength of network governance).
25. In some markets where reputation-based network governance plays an important role in
contracting, some large companies post their quality requirements and their standard terms and
conditions on their website so that the contours of what is and is not expected from their
counterparties is known throughout the market. See, e.g., Supplier Quality Manual, JOHN DEERE,
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/portal/jdsn/Applications?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/c
onnect/jdsn_website/jdsn/business+processes/quality/supplier_quality_manual/supplier_quality_
manual_index [https://perma.cc/57SG-BQUK]; Terms and Conditions for the Purchase of Goods
and Services, JOHN DEERE, https://www.johndeerestore.com/jdb2cstorefront/JohnDeereStore/
en/terms [https://perma.cc/B7DH-QPQU].
26. In such markets, general and impressionistic information about whether a transactor
behaved properly or poorly could still be easily transmitted, but in the absence of standard terms,
a consensus about what constitutes good behavior, or information about both what was promised
and what was done, this information is likely to be given less weight (especially when it travels
more than one step from its source) than information that circulates in markets where contracts
and/or expectations are either relatively standardized or widely known. Bernstein, supra note 24,
at 578–89 (discussing how John Deere achieves this).
27. Sometimes the line between relational and rational black holes may be blurry. For
example, Scott and Triantis note that it is often economically rational to use very standard-like
terms like “good faith,” “reasonable efforts,” or “best efforts,” and leave it for the court to give
these terms meaning ex post. Robert E. Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 835 (2006). However, once those terms become common in
an industry’s contracts (or between a pair of long-term repeat dealers), their presence in contracts
may be exceptionally sticky. If, for example, someone sends their counterparty a draft obligating
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literature has identified a variety of reasons that the inclusion of such
terms might be rational.28 Among them: transactors believe that they
will be better able to devise a response to a contingency when it
actually arises, since additional facts about its implications will be
known; transactors conclude that the probability a contingency will
arise is so low (or the variety of related contingencies is so large) that
it is not worth dealing with any or all of them ex ante; and finally,
transactors have divergent views of the bargaining power they will each
have when and if the issue arises, leading each to favor dealing with it
later. In addition, in some contexts, clauses may be left meaningless or
vague simply because transactors realize that in the event of a dispute
over the meaning of the clause, the aggrieved party is unlikely to have
a credible threat to sue for any of a number of reasons, including:
litigation costs, the reputational cost of litigation, the information they
would have to divulge in discovery,29 or the fact that litigation would
likely end their otherwise valuable contracting relationship. 30
D. Conclusion
In sum, the existence of black hole apparitions complicates any
attempt to deal with the black hole problem through changes in general
contract doctrine that are contingent on a term’s status as a black
hole.31 There are likely to be many contexts where black holes cannot

the counterparty (and themselves) to act in good faith, the relational costs of saying to one’s
counter party, “well let’s spell that out” or “let’s leave that out” might be high.
28. For a discussion of rational reasons why many clauses are left vague or undefined, see
Scott & Triantis, supra note 27, at 814–15. The literature conceptualizes these terms as
agreements-to-agree or agreements to determine meaning of a term through negotiation or
litigation if an interpretive dispute arises.
29. For a complete discussion of the ways that transactors’ “secrecy interest” in certain types
of business information may affect the credibility of their threat to sue in a variety of contexts,
see generally Omri Ben Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885 (2000).
30. In contracting relationships like those between an Original Equipment Manufacturer
and its suppliers of component parts where a lawsuit tends to end the parties contracting
relationship, many contractual provisions that are formally enforceable may not operate in the
shadow of the law at all. The reason is simple: if one of these provisions were breached in isolation,
the promisee would not have a credible threat to sue since the expected recovery would be very
unlikely to exceed the future value of the relationship as a whole. These “interior contract
provisions” operate outside of the shadow of the law, unless and until they are breached in
combination with enough other provisions that the counterparty concludes that there has been a
breach of the contracting relationship that makes it worthwhile to end the transactors’ business
relationship and sue. See Bernstein, supra note 24, at 570–71.
31. At one point in their analysis CG&S hint that it might be desirable to apply a knock-out
rule to black hole terms akin to the rule adopted by some courts applying U.C.C. § 2-207.
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be distinguished from black hole apparitions. In addition, depending
on precisely how a black hole is defined, there are likely to be some
instances where black holes exist yet the type of redrafting inertia that
beset the sovereign debt market is unlikely to arise since the need for
the type of market wide uniformity that is desirable when contracts are
akin to financial instruments will not exist. As a consequence, any
reform that conditions on a clause’s status as a black hole and applies
to commercial contracts generally is likely to be overinclusive. By
bringing commercial contracts dealing with the routine purchase and
sale of goods and provision of services within its purview, any such
reforms will increase litigation costs and create substantial social and
private costs of their own.
Indeed, the pari passu black hole itself can be understood as
arising from a mix of the procedural, relational, and rational
considerations that give rise to black hole apparitions. The pari passu
is partly a procedural black hole. Historically, the law of sovereign
immunity made it extraordinarily difficult to sue or collect judgments32
from other nations.33 Although in recent years it has become easier to
sue a sovereign,34 many collection barriers remain. These legal and
procedural barriers may be one reason why prior to a Brussels court’s
2000 decision in Elliott Associates v. Republic of Peru,35 there were no
contemporary judicial decisions interpreting the meaning of pari passu
provisions. The rote inclusion of the pari passu clause and the market’s
slow reaction to the NML decision36 can also be understood as the
However, this rule will also require black holes to be identified by courts and will therefore be
unworkable for many of the same reasons discussed herein.
32. See Sadie Blanchard, Courts Without Enforcement: Adjudicating Reputation in the
Sovereign Debt Market 6–7 (Oct. 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (concluding that “[e]ven
though [the holders of sovereign debt] cannot enforce debtor states’ obligations through
conventional judicial means, courts play a key role in the sovereign debt market . . . because they
provide information that has the power to provoke reactions by third parties that are costly for
the debtor or its agents,” so that “[c]reditors litigate because producing such information through
the courts strengthens their leverage in settlement negotiations,” and makes reputation a more
powerful force in the market).
33. See Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in
Court 10–11 (May 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2189997 [https://perma.cc/T2Q7-LNGN], (finding that only 5 percent of sovereign
defaults resulted in litigation until the 2000s, when the proportion rose to nearly half).
34. See W. Mark C. Weidermaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 67, 68–70 (2014).
35. Cours d’Appel de Bruxelles, 8th Chamber, 2000/QR/92, Elliott Assocs. v. République de
Peru, 2000/QR/92, Sept. 26, 2000.
36. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). The black
hole corpus also looks at the market’s nonresponse to a pari passu decisions of a Brussels court,
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product of relational costs. As CG&S point out, as long as rating
agencies did not downgrade bonds because the pari passu clause
remained unchanged, individual issuers were wary of changing the
clause and potentially triggering a negative rating-agency response.37
Finally, market players’ failure to revise the pari passu clause after the
aberrant court judgments may or may not have been rational.38
However, the decision not to attend to its meaning more precisely at
the time indentures were drafted may have been rational. After all, if
the clause had not been interpreted in court for such a long period, the
expected benefit of tinkering with it in a purposeful way might properly
have been seen as small. Together, these considerations suggest that
even on a purely conceptual level the line between a contract provision
whose meaning has been eroded as a result of procedural, relational,
and rational considerations and a true black hole is quite difficult to
demarcate with analytic precision.
II. THE PROPOSED DOCTRINAL RESPONSE
CG&S acknowledge that at present we have only a limited
understanding about the frequency of black holes and the contexts in
which courts’ erroneous interpretations of widely used terms will be
met with drafting inertia. Nevertheless, they conclude that immediate
legal reform to deal with the black hole problem is needed. In their
view, the “vexing collective action problems” that market participants
face when attempting to respond to errant court interpretations are so
significant that the potential social costs of not dealing with the black
hole problem are too significant to ignore.39
CG&S suggest that the best doctrinal way to deal with the black
hole problem is for courts interpreting “boilerplate terms in
commercial contracts”40 to be “open to arguments that as a matter of
law, the clause in question has been emptied of meaning and functions

but attributes it to market players’ beliefs that other, more important courts for the sovereign
debt community would not follow such an aberrant decision.
37. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 49.
38. As CG&S point out, it might not have been individually rational for any one issuer to
make these changes to their past and future indentures, even though it would have been rational
for the market as a whole to move to a different term. Id. at 13.
39. Id. at 37 (“We use both qualitative and quantitative data to support the claim that courts
searching for shared intent in the case of black holes in standardized contracting can result in
substantial social costs.”).
40. Id. at 67.
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as a black hole in boilerplate.”41 In cases in which the parties meet the
burden of establishing the existence of a black hole, the court would
then be required to adopt an interpretive approach that avoids any
inquiry into subjective intent and looks to other interpretive principles
to decide the case.42 Under the proposed approach, the hole or nonhole determination would turn on a variety of highly fact-specific
considerations and types of evidence. These include the types of
evidence adduced in the pari passu case study,43 as well as the types of
information needed to answer the following questions:
Has the clause been repeated by rote over many years, without having
been tested in litigation, where repetition has robbed the term of any
obvious conventional meaning? Has the term been embedded in
layers of legal jargon such that its intelligibility is substantially
reduced and variations in the formulation of the term across contracts
have no apparent significance? Is a historic or original meaning of the
term accessible in a fashion that makes sense in the contemporary
context and are contemporary commercial actors aware of that
meaning? Is there credible evidence that the particular provision was
priced at the original issue stage?44

Notwithstanding its theoretical appeal, the implementation of this
approach faces significant practical challenges. First, the test will be
widely overinclusive even with respect to standard provisions in
standard-form contracts because answers to these questions will not
reliably distinguish black holes from black hole apparitions.45
Moreover, because the new test applies to all standard commercial
agreements, it gives a significant advantage to the party with deeper
pockets who might claim a black hole exists simply to increase putative
litigation costs and thereby lever a better settlement.
Second, and relatedly, as CG&S themselves acknowledge,
introducing this inquiry would open the door to moral hazard and other
types of strategic behavior.46 Although they suggest that moral hazard

41. Id. at 68.
42. See id. at 66–67, 69 Exactly what this alternative interpretive approach would be is not
specified in great detail. See id. at 54–56. If, instead, some form of knock-out rule were
contemplated, similar problems would arise. See supra note 31.
43. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 38.
44. Id. at 68.
45. Indeed, the methodology CG&S used to reach the conclusion that the pari passu
provision was a black hole, rather than an efficient contract term, relied on extensive information
about the market’s response to the decision over a period of years. See id. at 11.
46. The types of strategic behavior it would introduce are analogous to those identified in
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can be adequately dealt with by adopting “an initial presumption
against the existence of a black hole,”47 even if they are correct the risk
of strategic behavior will remain substantial.
Third, even abstracting from overinclusiveness and strategic
behavior, as a practical matter the type of information CG&S view as
relevant to the black hole or non-black hole determination, will often
be either unavailable to the parties or prohibitively costly to obtain.48
For example, in contexts where the relevant contracts are not disclosed
under the securities laws, transactors’ reluctance to share this
information will make it impossible to get the contracts used in similar
transactions—an evidentiary problem that will prevent courts from
answering many of the questions that CG&S view as directly relevant
to the hole or no-hole determination. Similarly, there is no obvious way
to determine whether a particular clause has been priced into a
contract. In many settings, price and other terms are negotiated
separately, and even when they are not, determining the connection
between price and a particular term may be difficult either because the
transactors did not explicitly think about the connection or because
reconstructing the sequence of a negotiation from the testimony of
witnesses with conflicting agendas is likely to be an error-fraught
process. In addition, market players, even those who willingly spoke to
academics, might be reluctant to talk to litigators or testify in court.
Thus, even if in theory the hole or no-hole determination could be
accurately made on the basis of the types of evidence that CG&S view
as relevant, in practice much of this information is likely to be either
prohibitively expensive or entirely unavailable.
Fourth, while CG&S want the courts to intervene when “parties
exploit” either the absence of meaning or the presence of “random
variations in language [to advance] an interpretation the market
disavows,”49 they offer little guidance on how random variants can be
distinguished from what they call “rational design,”50 a determination
that would likely create both evidentiary problems and additional
interpretive uncertainty.51
Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 587 (2000) and Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. L. REV. 63, 106–08 (2015).
47. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 68.
48. Id. at 55–56, 64.
49. Id. at 1.
50. Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate, supra note 2, at 4.
51. CG&S undertake just this inquiry in another part of the black hole corpus. See id. at 6.
There, the authors seek to demonstrate that the observed variations in the pari passu clauses used
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Finally, without a more detailed description of the interpretive
rule that the court would apply when a hole is found and a better sense
of the extent to which the chosen rule would result in predictable
outcomes, it is difficult to asses how frequently the disputing parties
will have the proper incentives to take advantage of the proposed
reform and argue that black holes exist, even in contexts where they
both believe that a true black hole actually exists.
Consider, for example, a context in which both parties think that
the best subjective interpretation of a clause that they can advance is
better than the expected interpretation they think a court would give
the clause if a black hole were found to exist.52 In such a situation, both
parties might opt not to argue for a hole’s existence even if they both
genuinely believe that a hole exists. To see why, consider a plaintiff
who is trying to decide whether to plead that a hole exists or to advance
her own subjective interpretation of a clause. If she pleads that a hole
exists, the defendant faces a strategic choice. If he pleads that a hole
exists, then the court will likely find that a hole exists, deem the
subjective intent of the parties irrelevant, and interpret the clause using
its own interpretive principles. In contrast, if the defendant pleads his
subjective interpretation, the court will either accept his subjective
interpretation or conclude that a hole exists, deem subjective intent
irrelevant, and decide the case using its own interpretive principles.
Because (by assumption) both parties believe that their subjective
interpretation is better than the court’s interpretation, if the plaintiff
pleads that a hole exists, the defendant is better off pleading that his
subjective interpretation should govern. This response creates at least
some chance that the court will accept his preferred subjective
interpretation. Alternatively, if the plaintiff pleads her own subjective
interpretation of the clause, the defendant will reason that he is always
better off pleading his subjective interpretation than claiming that a
hole exists. If he argues for his subjective interpretation, there is at least
some possibility that the court will accept his interpretation, whereas if

in sovereign debt contracts are the result of random mutation rather than rational design. The
information and analysis they present is a good proxy for how difficult it would be for a transactor
to litigate this distinction in court. Moreover, not all of the information they refer to could be
known at trial—for example, how the market would respond if the court gave weight to a small
drafting difference.
52. When real black holes actually exist, parties are likely to be largely unconstrained with
respect to the range of plausible subjective intents they can proffer. As a consequence, the
assumptions made in the text are likely to characterize a meaningful subset of the cases that might
arise.
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he pleads a hole, the court will find either find that a hole exists or
accept the plaintiff’s subjective interpretation. Thus, regardless of the
plaintiff’s choice, the defendant is always better off arguing for his
subjective interpretation of the clause. Given this, the plaintiff too is
better off arguing for her own subjective interpretation of the clause,
since doing so creates at least some chance that her interpretation will
be accepted by the court. As a consequence, at least in the run of
situations where both parties think that the best subjective
interpretation of the clause they can advance is better than the
expected interpretation the court would give the clause, they are
unlikely to avail themselves of the proposed doctrinal step even when
a hole exists. Indeed, in the NML case itself neither party asserted that
the pari passu clause was without meaning. Rather each side advanced
an argument that it meant something different.53
A. Other Directions for Reform
In sum, proposals to alter contract doctrine to respond to the black
hole problem may be difficult to implement in practice. As a
consequence, to the extent that the problems revealed in the pari passu
saga are wide-spread, it is worthwhile to explore whether there are
approaches that do not rely on the hole-or-no-hole distinction that
could prove to be a more workable response to the black hole problem.
If, for example, the inertia problem were found to exist more
broadly in particular contexts—such as markets where the contracts
are closer to the pole of financial instruments than ordinary contracts
for services or the sale of goods54—a separate article of the UCC could
be added that would apply different interpretive standards as a matter
of course.55 This change would have the advantage of eliminating the
costly and uncertain black hole inquiry.56 Nevertheless, given the well53. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellant the Republic of Argentina, NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105cv(L) et al.), 2012 WL
6777133; Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, LTD and Olifant Fund,
LTD, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105cv(L) et al.), 2013 WL 388621.
54. CG&S are careful to delineate a number of reasons that the collective action problems
they observe in the sovereign debt markets where the contracts at issue—bond indentures—are
in practice closer to the pole of financial instruments, may be particularly severe compared to the
collective action problems that might or might not impede the revision of ordinary contracts for
sales of goods or provision of services when a court makes an aberrant interpretation of one of
their terms. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 59–66.
55. The reform could take the form of a new sub-chapter of Article 2 akin to Article 2A on
leases, or an additional subset of rules in Article 2 akin to its merchant rules.
56. While such a change would raise the issue of how to decide which contracts would come
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known problems that impede the American Law Institute (ALI) and
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) rules creation processes, such an approach, however
desirable, might also prove infeasible.57
Alternatively, if the black hole problem turns out to be widespread
in certain types of well-defined markets or types of contracts,
eliminating any inquiry into subjective intent in those contexts would
achieve most of the benefits of the proposed black hole reform without
increasing litigation costs or the frequency of strategic behavior. Black
holes aside, eschewing the legal fiction of subjective intent in the
interpretation of commercial contracts and adopting a largely textualist
plain-meaning oriented interpretive approach is a reform that would
likely prove highly beneficial for sophisticated commercial
transactors58 for reasons that have long been advanced by the neoformalist school of contract interpretation.59
Indeed, the neo-formalist approach reflected in the Second

within the new Article’s purview, it could be made available to the parties on an opt-in basis at
the time of contracting, subject to rejection by a court that found the choice to be inappropriate.
57. For an overview of the problems with these private uniform law-making bodies, see
generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143
U. PA. L. REV., 595–654 (1995). For an example of the difficulties of creating new Articles of the
UCC in particular, consider the largely failed effort to get states to adopt the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, which has been adopted by only two states. See The Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) Is a Proposed State Contract Law, UCITA
ONLINE,
http://www.ucitaonline.com/
[https://perma.cc/8SUP-W2L8]
(discussing
the
impediments to adopting the model law).
58. The best available, though imperfect, empirical evidence suggests that sophisticated
commercial parties prefer textualist adjudication. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern
Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 251 (Gregory Klass, George
Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (noting the common use of plain meaning
clauses in large commercial contracts providing for arbitration); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (documenting the cotton industry’s preference for a
textualist/formalist adjudicative approach); see also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern
Economy, supra (documenting the grain and feed industry’s preference for a textualist/formalist
legal approach); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009) (demonstrating commercial actors’ strong preferences for
relatively formalist New York Law); Stuart Popham, The View of European Business: Survey
Results
Presentation,
CLIFFORD
CHANCE
LLP
(Mar.
14,
2008),
http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Popham_-_presentation.PPT [https://perma.cc/DR
B3-KXAL] (finding that in business contracts that provided for arbitration at the International
Chamber of Commerce, transactors preferred British law, the most formalistic and textualist of
the EU alternatives).
59. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE
L.J. 926 (2010) (defending a formalist approach to contract interpretation).
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Circuit’s NML decision can be understood as taking aim at one of the
causes of black holes—namely, encrustation. According to CG&S,
encrustation is the end result of the meaningless drafting changes that
lawyers introduce either without thinking or to show their clients they
are doing something. By signaling that the court may well attach
radically different meanings to clauses with small wording differences,
the approach taken by the NML court does two key things: it increases
the cost of meaningless amendments and should therefore discourage
them; and it increases the return to meaningful amendments since the
court will take them into account in interpreting the clause which
should, in turn, encourage meaningful drafting. It can therefore be
understood as an interpretive penalty default rule that should over
time change drafting behavior in ways that may reduce the amount of
meaningless encrustation in commercial agreements and with it the
likelihood that black holes will emerge.
Nevertheless, despite the potentially significant problems that
black holes may create and the many possible directions legal reform
might take,60 the current understanding of black holes may be far too
limited to devise sufficiently nuanced reforms. As discussed further
below, there are reasons to question whether the saga of the pari passu,
which is the empirical foundation of CG&S’s call for immediate
reform, is, on its own, sufficient to justify the need for an immediate
and generally applicable legal response, especially given the many
differences—differences CG&S carefully delineate—between bond
indentures and the other types of contracts the proposed reform would
govern.

60. Another potential direction for reform that could be implemented without changing the
common law, but that depends critically on the ability of groups—like state legislatures, the ALI,
the NCCUSL, trade associations, and a variety of private entities and intermediaries—to revise
contractual language when courts make errant decisions, would be to selectively adopt the reform
proposals of the legal choice theorists. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE
THEORY OF CONTRACTS 102–13 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). These theorists explore the
benefits that might accrue when states and other private and public entities provide more
“contract types” that transactors could use to structure their affairs—much as Delaware law offers
those structuring a business the option of incorporating as a public entity, a close corporation, an
LLC or a partnership. If these “types” were carefully developed, and proved easier to change in
the event of an errant judicial interpretation of their terms than individually structured
agreements, heeding the call for the creation of these types may help solve the black hole problem
in some contracting contexts. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (noting that trade
associations have proved remarkably able to amend their trading rules and standard form
contracts in response to arbitral interpretations of these terms). But see Schwartz & Scott, infra
note 59 (discussing the problems that groups like the ALI have in revising their model laws).
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III. IS IMMEDIATE REFORM NEEDED?

Given the many difficulties that stand in the way of a legal solution
to the black hole problem, it is important to explore whether legal
reform is really needed. The answer to this question turns, in large part,
on whether the inertia in revising contract terms after an aberrant
decision interpreting a black hole is likely to be a frequent occurrence
across a variety of markets. It also depends on whether those black
holes that do emerge are likely to be enduring phenomena or a
transitory stage in the development of the relevant market.
There is no systematic empirical evidence about the frequency of
black holes. However, the experiences of American trade associations
that created standard form contracts and trading rules to govern
transactions among their members suggest that the inertia costs that
stem from collective action problems and impede the adoption of new
contract provisions, may decrease over time as industry participants
and/or market institutions learn how to more quickly respond to the
need for market-wide contractual change.
In the textile industry, for example, the first edition of The Worth
Street Textile Trading Rules,61 which consisted of both a set of trading
rules and a standard textile sales note, took eighteen years of
committee work to draft. The rules creation process “was fraught with
conflict, [and] involved negotiations among numerous trade
associations.”62 Yet once adopted, the rules were revised and even
entirely rewritten numerous times far more quickly and with a great
deal less infighting. Similarly, when the Silk Association of America set
out to create a set of trading rules for raw silk, many controversies
arose. The rules-creation process took seven years to complete because
“[t]he get-together spirit was not sufficiently pronounced to override
the differences that arose . . . .”63 Nevertheless, despite these initial
difficulties, the Raw Silk Trading Rules, like the Worth Street Rules,
were subsequently amended and revised many times with far less
difficulty. A 1921 amendment, for example, was adopted after only “a
year of careful study on the part of the [rules] Committee,”64 and a 1924

61. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 730–32 (1999) (providing a short history of
the Textile Trading Rules).
62. Id. at 732.
63. Id. at 736 (quoting SAA, THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1907)).
64. Id. (quoting SAA, FORTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1912), Revision, 3 Silkworm 73 (May
1921)).
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amendment was adopted after mere “months of intensive effort.”65
Similarly, the National Grain and Feed Association’s effort to adopt
the first set of Grain Trading Rules was also hard-fought and filled with
disagreement. Yet since their adoption, these rules have been
successfully amended seventy-seven times, also with little infighting
and only rare controversy. The experience of these and other industries
suggests that while the initial costs of agreeing on standard contract
terms and trading rules may be high, over time these costs tend to
gradually decrease as market players and institutions get used to
working with one another to respond to technological changes, market
changes, and other types of disruptions that require market-wide
changes in contractual rules or forms.
The experience of these and other groups is far from
determinative; yet it provides a reason to be cautiously optimistic that
the sovereign debt community will be able to respond more quickly in
the future to any adverse court decisions that might once again
threaten to impose large social costs on their market. There are even
indications that this may already be happening.66 The pari passu case
study reveals that when key market players first met at Columbia Law
School to discuss the NML court’s interpretation of the pari passu
clause in Argentine debt, the meeting was marked by so much
“dissension and disagreement”67 that the prospect of “any significant
movement towards wholesale revision of the clause [appeared]
unlikely in the near term.”68 Nevertheless, when the Federal Reserve
convened a meeting of many of the very same people just a few weeks
later, it became clear that “everyone involved needed, and was willing
to, cooperate in trying to solve the systemic problem caused by the
rogue interpretation of the New York courts.”69 Legal change
accelerated shortly thereafter.70
The experience of American trade associations and the sovereign
65. Id. (quoting SAA, FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1925)).
66. For a detailed discussion of the institutional response to the pari passu problem which
suggests that institutions “learn” each time they attempt responses, see Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller
& Brad Setser, Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign
Bonds, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (Martin
Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2016).
67. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 40.
68. Id. at 39.
69. Id. at 40.
70. However, as CG&S point out, these revisions occurred only in sovereign debt—not
quasi-sovereign debt—which in their view left the market facing significant social costs. Id. at 24–
25.
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debt community’s own response when they came together at the
Federal Reserve suggest that prudence is warranted in abstracting from
the saga of the pari passu. It is far from certain that any future errant
court decisions about the meaning of black holes in sovereign debt
indentures will remain unremedied by collective action for a significant
period of time. Only time and additional research on this and other
markets will reveal whether the saga of the pari passu is best
understood as: (1) an illustration of the transition problems that
particular types of markets face when they are confronted with the
need to overcome collective action obstacles to contractual change for
the first time; (2) an enduring feature of markets where contracts are
inter-dependent in ways that make the risk of judicial error more
serious than in other markets; or (3) a problem that exists in a wider
array of contracting contexts than standard contract theory would
predict.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored some of the conceptual and practical
problems that make it difficult to devise an effective legal strategy for
dealing with black holes. It has also questioned whether or not a legal
response to the black hole problem is needed. Still, nothing in the
discussion has taken anything away from the core contribution of the
black hole articles—namely, the identification of a distinct type of
contract provision that poses unique interpretive challenges and may
increase the consequences of judicial error in some contracting
contexts. This contribution is particularly timely because black holes
are likely to become increasingly common as a result of a number of
technological changes that facilitate the creation of complex
agreements with largely standardized yet slightly variant terms.71
Nevertheless, until more is known about black holes in both the
sovereign debt market and other contexts it might be best to refrain
from undertaking any general doctrinal legal reforms in response to
the phenomenon, especially as the type and magnitude of the problems
caused by black holes are likely to be vastly different depending on the

71. See, e.g., KMSTANDARDS (2016), KMstandards.com [https://perma.cc/5KTY-Z2NJ];
IACCM (2017), IACCM.com [https://perma.cc/YH8G-8D73] (providing contract drafting
software that permits the quick and inexpensive drafting of largely standard form contracts while
giving transactors a variety of clauses to choose from), the website of the International
Association of Contract and Commercial Managers [https://perma.cc/KKP7-3SMZ] (containing
information about new contract drafting technologies).
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market in question.
Moreover, the cost of not responding to the problem may be far
lower than it seems. The interpretive approach adopted by the Second
Circuit in NML v. Argentina may turn out to be the best or at least a
passably good long-run common law response to the black hole
problem—especially in markets where the players (individuals,
governments, and institutions) are sophisticated and are advised by
able counsel. By functioning as an interpretive penalty default rule,72
the Second Circuit’s adjudicative approach creates incentives for
transactors and market intermediaries like rating agencies to pay more
attention to drafting choices. It may also have the beneficial effect of
encouraging new or existing market or quasi-governmental
intermediaries to develop the institutional frameworks needed to
provide the types of tailored responses to contracting problems that
the common law cannot provide without introducing changes that will
be vastly over- or underinclusive and will also be likely to increase both
litigation costs and the incidence of strategic behavior.
Interestingly, while CG&S remain critical of the NML decision,
they now acknowledge that some type of institutional response
(whether induced by the common law or encouraged by other types of
government action) may, at the end of the day, be the best response to
the black hole problem in the long-run. As they explain in reference to
the interchange of ideas that led to this Comment:
[T]he true lesson of our study may be that the IMF and other groups
that constitute the ‘official sector’ may be better able than courts to
solve these problems over time as they gain experience and become
more confident in their methods. If this is so, then even though the
pari passu case shows that the intervention of a public authority is
sometimes required to solve contractual disputes that have thirdparty effects, relying on the courts rather than private ordering to
craft the solution may not always be the best choice.73

72. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–130 (1989) (describing the theory of the penalty default
rule).
73. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 69–70 (citing discussions with Bernstein).

